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ABSTRACT
One possible explanation for the difficulty in controlling the budget is that a major component of 
spending—tax expenditures—receives privileged status.  It is treated as tax cuts rather than spending.
This paper explores the implications of that classification and illustrates how it can lead to higher taxes,
larger government, and an inefficient mix of spending (too many tax expenditures).  The paper then
analyzes alternative budgeting approaches that would explicitly incorporate and measure tax expenditures.
It concludes by analyzing ways to control tax expenditures (and other spending) and the special challenges
presented by tax expenditures.
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1.  Introduction 
It has become almost a cliché that the projected growth of public debt in the United States is 
“unsustainable.” If current policies continue, the imbalance between spending and revenues will 
grow relative to the size of the economy, a path that may ultimately lead to a debt crisis.  An 
explicit or implicit default by the largest economy in the world could have dire consequences for 
the economies of the US and the rest of the world. (Auerbach and Gale, 2011; Burman, Rohaly, 
Rosenberg, and Lim, 2010) 
While many political leaders seem to understand this, controlling the debt has so far proven 
elusive. One reason is that two of the prime drivers of the debt—mandatory programs such as 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, and tax expenditures such as the tax subsidy for 
employer-sponsored health insurance—are very popular, not subject to the regular controls of the 
budget process, and growing fast. 
Although mandatory spending and tax expenditures are similar in the sense that they are 
generally open-ended entitlements and operate outside the annual appropriations process, the 
costs of tax expenditures have the additional feature of being largely invisible to policy makers 
and citizens.  Their cost is simply netted out of overall tax revenues.  Tax expenditures are not 
treated as spending at all, but as reductions in taxes.  Their hidden nature has made tax 
expenditures irresistible to policymakers of both parties—many political or policy goals can be 
achieved through stealthy spending programs that are framed as tax cuts.   
The late economist, David Bradford, famously pointed out that virtually any spending 
program could be transformed into a tax expenditure. (Bradford 2003) To illustrate the point, he 
proposed a Weapons Supply Tax Credit, which would allow arms manufacturers to sell their 
ordinance to the pentagon in exchange for tax credits rather than cash.  Instantly, the Defense 
Department’s budget would decline by the amount of transformed spending.  Tax revenues 
would decline by a similar amount (or more, if weapons suppliers demanded a premium on 
account of the complexities and uncertainties associated with the tax credit mechanism).  But 
government would be doing exactly the same thing.  Only the accounting would change. 2 
 
A real world example is the low-income housing credit.  Enacted as part of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, it was modeled on HUD programs that subsidized the construction and 
rehabilitation of affordable housing.  The credit replaced existing tax incentives that were 
extremely inefficient and poorly targeted and generally thought to help investors more than low-
income renters.  Nonetheless, there are drawbacks to the credit program may be less efficient 
than an equivalent grant program.
1  For example, the credits are only valuable to investors to the 
extent that they have tax liability, which creates uncertainty and thus causes investors to demand 
more in tax credits than they would a cash grant.  Furthermore, since many low-income housing 
projects are organized by non-profits that cannot benefit from tax credits, the tax-exempt 
sponsors have to set up complex syndication schemes to reallocate credits to taxable investors, 
which adds to the cost of the projects.  Industry advocates counter that the credit mechanism may 
offer some advantages, perhaps because it avoids inherent inefficiencies and uncertainties in the 
way traditional housing programs are run.  Nonetheless, it’s clear that the credit program is 
effectively a cash spending program, but one operated by the IRS rather than HUD. 
The tax credit approach has commanded strong bipartisan support at least in part because of 
the useful obfuscation of its provenance and funding.
2  But in 2009 the veil was lifted when the 
financial crisis caused many low-income housing credit investors to move into a tax loss 
position, making it difficult for states, which allocate the credits, to find investors willing to 
participate.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allowed states to elect to 
issue cash grants in lieu of tax credits. (US Treasury 2009)  This converted an estimated $3 
billion of tax expenditures into cash outlays in 2009.  In 2010, the veil returned and the 
government’s finances returned to their conventionally obscured state. 
                                                 
1 Burman and McFarlane (2005) cite evidence from the 1990s of extremely high internal rates of return on tax credit 
financed investments.  Ernst and Young (2010) estimated that these returns had declined from 18 percent in 1991 to 
rates of 6-7 percent in 2007.  In private correspondence, Robert Rozen, a longtime advocate for the program, wrote 
that low-income housing projects had a foreclosure rate far lower than other real estate “and vastly superior to direct 
spending housing programs.”   
2 An additional advantage of the tax credit mechanism from the perspective of supporters of low-income housing 
programs is that it can represent a longer-term commitment since it does not need to be reauthorized by Congress.  
However, the credit was initially a temporary provision set to expire at the end of 1988.  It was renewed several 
times before it was made permanent in 1993. 3 
 
Why would policymakers routinely favor tax expenditures over potentially more efficient 
spending alternatives?  In a nutshell, it is because sponsors of explicit spending may be attacked 
for favoring high taxes and big government.  A similar tax expenditure program makes both 
taxes and spending appear lower, which offers obvious political advantages. 
In this paper, we develop a simple model that illustrates incentives created by current tax 
expenditure accounting.  In the model, voters value both direct spending and tax expenditures, 
and dislike taxes and deficits.  Their assessment of spending is based on their own experience—
i.e., they value the roads they drive on or the credits or deductions they claim on their tax 
returns—but they assess the burden of current taxes and deficits based at least in part on 
government’s aggregate measures.  In this model, treating some spending as negative taxes 
results in (1) higher taxes and larger government and (2) an inefficient mix of spending (too 
many tax expenditures).   
In contrast, transparent accounting for tax expenditures would result in less overall spending 
and a more efficient allocation of resources.   
Beyond the simple theoretical model, there are significant challenges to accounting for tax 
expenditures.  Tax expenditures are measured as deviations from a baseline “normal tax” system.  
The primary challenge is determining what that system should be.  US government estimates use 
a fairly comprehensive income tax as the baseline.  Some have suggested that a consumption tax 
should be used as the baseline in order to ensure that policies are not biased against savings tax 
incentives.  Many of the largest tax expenditures, however, would be treated similarly under 
either baseline.   
The paper then describes the current budget process and analyzes options for reform to the 
process that would explicitly and consistently incorporate and control tax expenditures.  Beyond 
simply measuring tax expenditures and presenting them alongside explicit spending, the budget 
process could be modified to include a single cap on all spending—discretionary, mandatory, 
and tax expenditures—to facilitate tradeoffs of tax expenditures and explicit spending.  For a cap 
to be effective, there must also be incentives for policy makers to abide by the cap. 4 
 
2.  Tax Expenditures: Meaning, Measurement, Consequences 
The term “tax expenditure” is attributed to Stanley S. Surrey who in 1967, as Assistant 
Secretary of the US Treasury for Tax Policy, instructed his staff to compile a list of preferences 
and concessions in the income tax that had the nature of expenditure programs.  His goal was 
straightforward:  to draw attention to these items in hopes of building momentum for tax reform, 
which would redirect the tax system toward its core function of raising revenues.   
Surrey and coauthor, Paul R. McDaniel, defined the concept thus in their 1985 treatise on the 
subject: 
The tax expenditure concept posits that an income tax is composed of two distinct 
elements.  The first element consists of structural provisions necessary to implement a 
normal income tax, such as the definition of net income, the specification of accounting 
rules, the determination of the entities subject to tax, the determination of the rate 
schedule and exemption levels, and the application of the tax to international transactions.  
The second element consists of the special preferences found in every income tax.  These 
provisions, often called tax incentives or tax subsidies, are departures from the normal tax 
structure and are designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class or persons.  
They take many forms, such as permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals 
of tax liabilities, credits against tax, or special rates.  Whatever their form, these 
departures from the normative tax structure represent government spending for favored 
activities or groups, effected through the tax system rather than through direct grants, 
loans, or other forms of government assistance.  (p. 3) 
Seven years after Treasury first published a list of tax expenditures in 1967, the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 required the Administration to publish a tabulation of tax 
expenditures as part of its annual budget submission.  The concept also gained widespread 
acceptance outside of the United States.  Germany had invented the concept—if not the name—
more than a decade before the US and included tax expenditure analysis in its budget process.  
(Shaviro 2004)  Both Canada and the United Kingdom started publishing lists of tax 
expenditures in the late 1970s, and many other OECD countries had either adopted that practice 
or conducted preliminary studies by 1985.  (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985) 
In the U.S., the  President’s and congressional budget documents include tabulations of tax 
expenditures, defined as deviations from the “normal” individual and corporate income tax 
bases, along with estimates of the revenue losses from each.  In principal, tax expenditures could 
also be defined with respect to other taxes, such as payroll taxes, estate taxes, and excise taxes, 5 
 
but that has not been done on a systematic basis.
3  However, while explicit spending is integral to 
the budget presentation, tax expenditures are relegated to an appendix. They provide 
supplementary information to budget users, but they have no direct role in the budget process.   
Furthermore, tax expenditures appear as reductions in taxes, but they are equivalent to cash 
spending. A more transparent accounting and reporting of tax expenditures would show both 
government spending and taxes to be higher than is currently reported.  This is more than simply 
a matter of presentation. As explained below, this characterization of tax expenditures has 
motivated and facilitated a shift in spending away from traditional forms and into the tax code. 
2.1. Measuring Tax Expenditures 
Each year, the Treasury Department compiles a list of income tax expenditures, which is 
included in the Analytical Perspectives volume of the Administration’s Budget released in early 
February.  The Joint Committee on Taxation prepares a similar list for Congress.
4  The purpose 
of the tax expenditure estimates is to raise the visibility of the cost of tax subsidies.   
It is not clear that these compilations have had any effect on the use of tax expenditures 
because it is impossible to tell what the level would have been absent annual revelation.  Surrey 
and McDaniel (1985) calculated that tax expenditures grew faster than GDP and much faster 
than cash outlays in the first fifteen years that tax expenditure estimates were produced, between 
1967 and 1982.  In 1986, there was a sharp reduction in the value of tax expenditures as a result 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which reduced marginal tax rates (and reduced the value of 
deductions and exclusions) and eliminated many tax preferences.  (See Figure 1.)  The growth in 
the value of tax expenditures resumed through the 1990s because of increases in top tax rates and 
the introduction of some new tax subsidies such as the child tax credit (in 1997).  Rate cuts in 
                                                 
3 The US reported tax expenditures measured against a comprehensive estate and gift tax baseline until 2002.  Davie 
(1994) discusses possible tax expenditures created by special excise tax provisions.  Bankman, et al (this volume) 
discuss the exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance—a large tax expenditure relative to both the income 
and payroll tax. 
4 This task was originally assigned to the Congressional Budget Office, but they ceded it to the Joint Committee on 
Taxation because the JCT was designated the official revenue estimator and was thus best prepared to estimate tax 
expenditures (Kleinbard 2010). 6 
 
2001 and 2003 trimmed tax expenditures again, but the total has since risen because of new tax 
expenditures (including a set of temporary economic stimulus tax measures enacted in 2009). 
Figure 1.  Number and Value (as Percent of GDP) of Tax Expenditure provisions,  
1983-2009
 
Moreover, the sheer number of tax expenditures has increased sharply since the enactment of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  The Joint Committee on Taxation (2011) estimated that there were 
202 tax expenditures in 2007, a 50 percent increase from 1986, when there were 135.  Some of 
this increase was due to a change in the way the JCT compiled tax expenditures.  (Buckley 2011)  
So the specific estimates should be taken with a large grain of salt, but there's no doubt that the 
number increased fairly dramatically.  However, Buckley also points out that many of the largest 
tax expenditures have been in the tax code for a very long time and survived the massive tax 
reform enacted in 1986, suggesting that there is little political will to revise these programs. 
Tax expenditures are large relative to other spending. (Table 1).  Income tax expenditures 
will amount to about $1.2 trillion in fiscal year 2011 based on US Treasury estimates.  That is 
significantly larger than nondefense or defense discretionary spending.  Tax expenditures would 
roughly equal total discretionary spending were it not for the extra outlays authorized in an effort 
to boost the economy out of recession.  Overall, income tax expenditures are one-quarter of total 
spending, or about 8 percent of GDP.  Put another way, excluding income tax expenditures 
causes spending to be about one-third less than it would be if tax expenditures were included in 














































































Source: For tax expenditures as percent of GDP, GAO analysis of OMB, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Years 1985-2011; for count of provisions, Joint Committee on Taxation (annual tax expenditure compilations back to 1985), and author's 
calculations. 7 
 
Table 1.  Income Tax Expenditures Compared with Explicit Spending, FY2011  
 
Income Tax 
Expenditures  Mandatory  Discretionary  Defense 
Non-
defense 
$ Billions  1,177  2,165  1,415  744  671 
Percent of total  
spending  24.7  45.5  29.7  15.6  14.1 
% of GDP  7.6  14.0  9.1  4.8  4.3 
Source:  Budget of the United States, FY2011, and authors’ calculations 
 
Income tax expenditures are also large relative to tax collections (Table 2).  In 2011, they 
exceed the individual income tax, which is the largest single source of revenue.  This is 
somewhat anomalous because the recession cut income tax revenues and temporarily increased 
the number of tax expenditures.  Eliminating income tax expenditures could allow income tax 
rates to be cut by about half with no loss of net tax revenues, could eliminate all or most of 
projected budget deficits for the next 20 years, or could finance a combination of rate reduction 
and deficit reductions.
5 This was the approach of President Obama’s debt reduction commission. 
(National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 2010) 
Table 2.  Income Tax Expenditures Compared with Explicit Taxes, FY2011 









$ Billions  1,177  1,121  297  935  214
Percent of total 
revenues  31.4  29.9  7.9  25.0  5.7 
% of GDP  7.6  7.2  1.9  6.0  1.4 
While the relative importance of tax expenditures depends on income tax rates, and thus the 
magnitude has waxed and waned somewhat with changes in rates, overall they have remained a 
                                                 
5 Buckley (2011) expresses deep skepticism about such statements about the effect of eliminating all tax 
expenditures on net tax collections.  First, he argues that eliminating all tax expenditures is not politically feasible.  
Second, he believes that behavioral responses to eliminating tax expenditures would causes revenues to fall far short 
of the static tax expenditure estimates.  He’s probably right about political feasibility, but that is not relevant to 
discussions about the opportunity cost of tax expenditures.  As for the effect of a wholesale elimination of tax 
expenditures on tax avoidance, we believe that is a more open question.  On the one hand, eliminating individual tax 
subsidies would certainly create incentives for the kind of avoidance response that Buckley chronicles.  On the 
other, eliminating large numbers of tax expenditures would reduce the avenues available for tax avoidance.  That is, 
hiding income from the tax collectors would be much more difficult if all or most of the explicit tax loopholes were 
eliminated.  Nonetheless, it is clear that there is tremendous uncertainty about the revenue potential from eliminating 
all tax expenditures. 8 
 
significant component of overall spending (Figure 2).  Meanwhile, mandatory programs have 
been inexorably growing.  Defense has also proven difficult to control. 
  
2.2. Issues in measuring tax expenditures 
A number of issues arise in measuring tax expenditures.
6 To start, it is important to note that, 
by convention, a tax expenditure estimate is not a revenue estimate.  Instead, it reflects the 
amount by which tax liability is reduced due to a particular tax provision. The estimate does not 
                                                 
6 Shaviro (2004) raises a more fundamental point, arguing that taxes and spending are both meaningless concepts.  
Shaviro believes that programs on both sides of the ledger should be characterized based on whether they have 
primarily allocative roles or distributional roles.  So a road construction program or the low-income housing credit 
are primarily allocative in nature—that is, redirecting resources to particular economic activities—whereas TANF or 
the EITC are primarily distributional.  Shaviro, however, also recognized that the characterization of programs as 
“tax” or “spending” matter when political actors view the terms as meaningful.  While intriguing, we view these 















include any behavioral response, which would be incorporated in a revenue estimate.  Thus, for 
example, if the American opportunity tax credit—a tax credit for the first two years of post-
secondary education—were eliminated, many taxpayers who would have used that credit would 
instead opt for the less generous lifetime learning tax credit or other tax subsidies aimed at higher 
education.  In consequence, the revenue savings to the Treasury would be only a fraction of the 
amount of American opportunity tax credits allowed.
7   
In addition, government estimates of tax expenditures do not account for losses in tax 
revenues from other revenue sources, most notably payroll taxes.  For example, Joint Committee 
on Taxation (2008) estimated that the loss in payroll tax revenues from the tax exclusion for 
employer contributions to health insurance—the largest tax expenditure in 2011—is about two-
thirds of the income tax revenue loss alone.  Thus, the total income plus payroll tax expenditure 
could be about $300 billion compared with the estimate for the income tax expenditure alone of 
$177 billion.  (See Table 3.) 
Table 3.  Largest Tax Expenditures in FY 2011, In Billions of Dollars
* 
  Provision   Amount 
1  Exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance   177.0  
2  Mortgage interest deduction   104.5  
3  401(k) plans   67.1  
4  Deduction for state and local taxes other than property taxes   46.5  
5  Step-up basis of capital gains at death   44.5  
6  Lower rate on capital gains   44.3  
7  Charitable deduction (other than education and health)   43.9  
8  Pensions (defined benefit)  44.6  
9  Exclusion of net imputed rental income   37.6  
10  Capital gains exclusion on home sales   31.3  
Note:  Provisions are ranked based on 5-year total cost, FY 2011-2015. 
Source:  US Budget, Analytical Perspectives, FY2011  
 
Another apparent problem in attempting to gauge the importance of tax expenditures over 
time is that the cost of a group of tax expenditures is likely to differ from the sum of the 
individual estimates.  For example, the cost of the deduction for home mortgage interest—the 
                                                 
7 The same problem could occur in assessing outlays on explicit spending programs.  For example, if the 
government were to eliminate Pell grants, which subsidize higher education, outlays for student loans could 
increase. 10 
 
second largest tax expenditure on Table 3—and the deduction for state and local taxes—the sixth 
largest—could be less than the sum of the two estimates.  If either tax preference were 
eliminated, fewer taxpayers would itemize deductions, making the value of the second tax 
preference significantly smaller.
8  However, Burman, Toder, and Geissler (2007) estimated that 
the overall cost of all individual tax expenditures is larger than the sum of the individual tax 
expenditures by about 6 percent. This occurs primarily because eliminating tax expenditures 
pushes some taxpayers into higher marginal tax brackets, which raises the value of remaining tax 
expenditures. 
The Century Foundation Working Group on Tax Expenditures, a bipartisan group convened 
to evaluate current tax expenditures and make recommendations about how to improve 
monitoring and reporting, recommended a number of changes in the way tax expenditure 
information is reported. (Toder, Wasow, and Ettlinger, 2002)  These include:  annual estimates 
of the cost of all tax expenditures together and grouped by budget category; historical estimates 
of total tax expenditures based on a consistent methodology; and detailed information about the 
distribution of tax benefits as well as an assessment of how well the tax expenditures work. 
2.2.1. The problem of baseline 
The most serious challenge in measuring tax expenditures is in defining the “normal income 
tax.”  Surrey and McDaniel (1985) argue that it should be a comprehensive Haig-Simons 
measure of income with adjustments to reflect problems of administration.  As vague as that 
guideline is, the actual choice is even more nebulous.  Surrey and McDaniel are agnostic about 
fundamental issues, such as whether the normal income tax should be indexed for inflation.  
Their basic view is that a fixed relatively comprehensive baseline should be chosen and it would 
serve as a useful measuring rod against which to gauge progress or lack thereof in improving the 
tax system. 
                                                 
8 Taxpayers can take advantage of itemized deductions only to the extent that the total of all those deductions 
exceeds a standard deduction, which varies by filing status.  Almost two thirds of tax returns in 2008 could not 
benefit from the deduction for charity, for example, because their deductible expenses were less than the standard 
deduction.  (Internal Revenue Service 2010) 11 
 
There are some peculiar consequences of this approach.  Expensing and accelerated 
depreciation of investments are treated as tax expenditures, whereas the taxation of capital gains 
on a realization basis, rather than as they accrue, is treated as part of the normal tax.
9  Those 
provisions all convey tax benefits through a similar mechanism—taking advantage of the time 
value of money.  Accelerating deductions and deferring income are two sides of the same tax-
minimization strategy, but only the deduction is counted as a tax expenditure.  An even more 
stark contrast is with the treatment of savings bonds, on which the interest income is deferred 
until the bond is cashed in, which is identical to the treatment of capital gains.  But the former is 
considered a tax expenditure, because accrual taxation of bond interest is straightforward (and 
the norm for most bonds), whereas accrual taxation of gains is not. 
The normal income tax contains a classical corporate income tax with no offset for double 
taxation, even though corporate income would only be taxed once, on an accrual basis at the 
shareholder’s tax rate under an ideal income tax. Under an economic income baseline, the 
taxation of dividends (as well as part of the tax on capital gains) would be a negative tax 
expenditure.
10 
There are also issues about the treatment of what Surrey and McDaniel (1985) called 
“structural provisions,” which he did not consider tax expenditures.  Personal exemptions, for 
example, are identified as structural elements even though they are essentially subsidies based on 
family size—the deduction counterpart to the child tax credit, which is considered a tax 
expenditure.  In addition, some commentators have argued that the normal tax should be a flat-
rate tax, in which case progressive tax rates should be considered tax expenditures.
11  Indeed, the 
                                                 
9 Haig-Simons income would include accrued capital gains, but the normal tax measures capital gains on a 
realization basis.  Three factors drove this decision:  historical precedent (gains have always been taxed for most 
individuals on a realization basis); the widely held belief that accrued but unrealized gains are not income; and the 
administrative difficulty of taxing gains when the sale price is not observable.  Surrey and McDaniel (1985) seem 
ambivalent on this choice, deeming it as appropriate as of 1985, but one that should be reexamined over time.   
10 However, it is also true that many corporations pay little or no tax.  In those cases, dividend and capital gains 
taxation may come closer to the tax burden under an integrated corporate tax. (Burman 2003)  So the actual size and 
sign of the tax expenditure attributable to dividends and capital gains taxation relative to an economic income 
baseline is unclear. 
11 In another inconsistency, the lower tax rate that applies to small firms is considered a corporate income tax 
expenditure. 12 
 
current progressive rate structure could be mimicked by a flat-rate tax with a credit that 
corresponds to the savings from progressive rates.
12  If the benefit of progressive tax rates were 
considered a tax expenditure, it would be the largest one in the tax code, by far.
13   
The most contentious issue is whether to define the normal tax as an income tax or a 
consumption tax.  If the income tax is considered the norm, then savings tax incentives—such as 
tax-exemption for individual retirement accounts and pensions, and preferential tax rates for 
capital gains—are tax expenditures.  The FY2003 Budget argued that the growing prevalence of 
tax-free savings vehicles might suggest a change in norm.  "...[T]he growing presence of tax-
deferred savings vehicles in the tax code suggests that these may today be part of the 'normal' 
income tax circa 2002." (US Office of Management and Budget, 2002, p. 96)   
If a consumption tax is taken as the norm, then the taxation of interest and dividends are 
negative tax expenditures—that is, taxation in excess of the norm—and tax-exempt pensions and 
individual retirement accounts are part of the normal tax and not tax expenditures at all.  Against 
this baseline, preferential tax rates on capital gains constitute a negative tax expenditure because 
they exceed the benchmark rate of zero.  In contrast, against the income tax baseline, the failure 
to tax realized capital gains at full rates is the sixth largest tax expenditure.  (See Table 3.) 
People who favor an income tax also tend to favor the current method of measuring and 
displaying tax expenditures.  Those who would prefer heavier reliance on consumption taxes 
would favor defining the normal tax as a broad-based consumption tax.
14  Given that the actual 
income tax is a hybrid system containing many elements of income and consumption taxation, 
there is no obvious way to resolve this difference. 
                                                 
12 For example, consider a very simple progressive tax system where the first $50,000 of taxable income is taxed at a 
10-percent rate and income above that level is taxed at a 25-percent rate.  Alternatively, all income could be taxed at 
a flat 25 percent, with a moderate-income family support credit (MIFSC) equal to 15 percent of income up to a 
maximum of $7,500 (15 percent of $50,000).  Presumably the MIFSC would be treated as a tax expenditure under 
current rules, even though the benefit of the 10-percent rate bracket is not considered a tax expenditure. 
13 A very rough calculation suggests that, in tax year 2008, individual income tax before credits would have been 
about $900 billion higher if all taxed at the top statutory tax rate of 35 percent (before accounting for additional tax 
avoidance). 
14 Indeed, economist Bruce Bartlett (2001) argued that using an income tax baseline creates a “…bias in favor of 
liberal tax policy.” 13 
 
One option would be to consider only the tax expenditures that would be the same against 
any baseline.  About half of the items in Table 3 are in that category.  There are issues involved 
in excluding savings tax preferences, however.  Their benefit is most skewed towards those with 
higher incomes (the main justification for retaining an income tax is that taxing saving increases 
overall progressivity).  And excluding savings tax breaks might create a bias in favor of moving 
to a consumption tax, which might create an obstacle to bipartisan agreement. 
Even those who favor a consumption tax could find useful information in the current tax 
expenditure tabulations.  A hybrid income-consumption tax, as we have in the United States, 
may actually do more to impair national savings than a pure income tax, because of the non-
neutralities among different kinds of saving and investment.  The tax expenditure list provides at 
least a crude measure of these non-neutralities, insofar as it shows that particular industries or 
forms of saving benefit more than others.   
2.3. The implication of ignoring tax expenditures in the budget 
Incorporating tax expenditures into the budget would increase budget transparency. 
Kleinbard (2010) recommends that open-ended tax expenditures (most of them) should be 
treated as mandatory spending while those few tax expenditures that are subject to  appropriation 
limits (like the low-income housing credit) be included in the budget with discretionary 
spending.   But currently, tax expenditures are simply subtracted from overall tax revenues and 
excluded from spending totals altogether.  New tax expenditures reduce reported revenues while 
leaving reported spending unchanged when, in fact, they should be added to spending while 
leaving total revenues unchanged. 
Why does this matter? For measuring the deficit, it doesn't. Since the deficit is spending 
minus revenues, the difference will be the same whether tax expenditures are recorded as 
positive spending or negative revenues. If policymakers and the public were perfectly rational 
and fully informed, presumably budget choices would be unaffected by the accounting. 
In fact, we believe that current accounting for tax expenditures introduces substantial biases. 
Taxpayers may like government spending programs, but dislike paying for them. In that light, an 
increase in explicit spending and higher taxes now or in the future  is much less attractive than an 
increase in spending that masquerades as a "tax cut"—taxpayers get benefits along with the 14 
 
illusion that they are costless. Tax expenditures make government appear smaller while 
providing more benefits. This creates the illusion of extreme policy efficiency when, in fact, tax 
expenditures are often less efficient than alternative cash programs. 
2.3.1. A simple model of tax expenditure distortions 
To illustrate how failure to explicitly account for tax expenditures in tax and spending totals 
might bias budget decisions, consider this stylized model of political choice.  Policy makers 
choose taxes, cash outlays, and tax expenditures to maximize votes, which are a function of the 
representative (or median) voter’s preferences.  The representative voter values cash outlay 
programs and tax expenditures.  She benefits from new roads, national defense, courts, Medicare, 
Social Security, etc., as well as the tax deductions, credits, and exclusions that apply to her.  
However, she understands that at least a portion of current spending will come at the expense of 
current or future consumption of private goods, which she also values.  She fully understands the 
cost of cash outlays, but may underestimate the burden attributable to tax expenditures because 
they are not included in published tax or spending totals.   In others words, taxes and spending 
appear smaller because tax expenditures are excluded. 
One way to think of this model is in the context of the “fiscal illusion” framework employed 
in the public choice literature.  For example, according to Ura and Stocker (2011), “Revenue 
collection strategies which obscure the cost of government should interfere with citizens’ ability 
to effectively evaluate government services and programs. When benefits remain evident while 
costs are hidden, citizens will demand additional services and benefits without regard to costs, 
creating electoral pressure on officeholders to expand the scope of government activity.”  Ura 
and Stocker use this framework to explain why underestimating the cost of deficits could lead to 
larger government, but the same framework explains why the cost of tax expenditures might be 
misperceived. 
Define the amount of cash outlays as X and tax expenditures as E, and the resultant perceived 
tax burden (present or future) as T.  Define a fiscal illusion parameter, α, which corresponds to 
the fraction of tax expenditures that voters disregard in assessing tax burdens.  α=1 corresponds 
to full illusion, where tax expenditures are netted out of spending and taxes and appear to be free; 
α=0 would correspond to full transparency (where tax expenditures are treated the same as cash 15 
 
outlays).  We posit that voters perceive only part of the burden of tax expenditures—that is, 
0<α<1. 
The policymaker’s problem is: 
max
 , 
    , ,     
Subject to               1   α     
V is a vote function.  ̂ is the portion of tax expenditures that voters understand they have to pay 
for, either now or later.
15 We assume that V1 > 0, V2 > 0, and V3 <0.  That is, voters value cash 
and tax expenditures and are averse to perceived tax burden.  Assume further that Vii < 0 for all i.  
Interpreting V as a kind of utility of government function, this means that the median voter has 
diminishing marginal utility for expenditures and increasing marginal aversion to perceived 
taxes.  Defining the Lagrangian, L, in the usual way and maximizing with respect to X, E, and     
yields the following first-order conditions (assuming an interior solution): 
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If taxpayers are well informed, α=0, and            .  Perceived tax burden equals actual 
tax burden.  The first-order conditions produce the intuitive result: 
                                                 
15 In terms of the utility function of the representative consumer or median voter, the consumer’s problem 
(assuming non-distorting lump-sum taxation) is max U(X, E, c), s.t.          , where c is consumption of a 
composite private good, y is (exogenous) income, and θ is that voter’s share of the costs of government. Substituting 
the budget constraint into the utility function yields    , ,       .  Given y and θ are fixed, by assumption, this 
can be written as    , ,    , a positive function of X and E, and a negative function of    .  This is the vote function. 16 
 
                
That is, the marginal utility of cash and tax expenditures are equal to each other and to the 
marginal disutility of taxes.
16   
Allowing α > 0, we can write the first-order condition in terms of a marginal rate of 










Effectively, fiscal illusion causes voters to misperceive the price of E as less than 1.  The 
result is an unambiguous increase in E and government spending and actual taxes or deficits.  
Spending on cash outlays can increase, decrease, or stay the same depending on the degree of 
substitutability between X and E. 
Figure 3 illustrates the case where the elasticity of substitution between X and E, σ, is 1 (i.e., 
Cobb-Douglas utility function).  Assuming constant cost per unit of producing X and E, fiscal 
illusion amounts to a reduction in the price of E from 1 to 1-α.  If   
 ,   
  solve the policymaker’s 
maximization problem when α = 0,         
      
  , then introducing fiscal illusion rotates the 
budget constraint clockwise.  Holding     constant, the new budget constraint is shown on the 
Figure.  In the special case where σ = 1, X
* does not change    
      
  , while   
   
  
 
    .    
 ,   
  
still solve the first-order conditions given α. 
                                                 
16 Note that this framework could subsume the deficit illusion analyzed by Ura and Socker (2011).  In that context, 
V3 becomes too small, implying large amounts of cash and tax expenditures because people don’t fully perceive how 
they translate into current or future taxes. 17 
 
 
In this special case, cash outlays remain unchanged, tax expenditures increase, and the size of 
government increases. 
Figure 4 shows the situation in the case where X and E are substitutes.
17   In this case, starting 
from the optimum when α = 0, imposing fiscal solution again rotates the budget constraint 
clockwise.  The vote maximum subject to the new constraint, at point B, does not solve the 
optimization problem because       
  (as E is substituted for X at the lower price).  Lower X 
raises V1, implying that at the new optimum,     will rise.  So the budget constraint shifts outward.  
At the new optimum, C,   
   
  
 
    .  Total spending increases even more than in the σ = 1 case.   
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It is clear in this model that fiscal illusion introduces an inefficiently large government and 
an inefficient allocation of public spending in favor of tax expenditures.  However, the 
inefficiency could be even larger if the cost per unit of producing X and E increase with 
spending.  In particular, if some programs are natural to run through program agencies and others 
through the tax code, then shifting more spending through the tax code (or cash outlays) starting 
from the optimal allocation will introduce production inefficiency as well as lost utility to 
consumers (voters). 
We can extend the model above to account for increasing costs of production of X and E.  To 
simplify, assume that the costs are separable and that the perceived cost of government is  
                    1      
where Cx and CE satisfy      0 and       0.  Substituting this budget constraint into the 
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The optimum now sets marginal utility equal to marginal perceived cost. And instead of equating 
the marginal rate of substitution and (1 – α), the optimum equalizes MRS and (1 – α) times 
marginal rate of transformation. 










The three panels of Figure 5 illustrate the effects of fiscal illusion on the determination of X and 
E under various degrees of substitutability in the vote function.  The qualitative conclusions do 
not change from the constant cost case, however, the degree of shifting from X to E declines.  As 
in the linear case, E and overall spending will tend to rise most when X and E are substitutes.  E 
does not increase as much as in the linear case because the cost per unit of producing E increases 
as more spending is channeled through tax expenditures.  When X and E are complements, X will 
tend to rise while the increase in E will be smaller.
18  In the latter case, the overall size of 
government does not grow as much.  But, that is only because the perceived cost of increasing E 
increases when X must increase as well. 
                                                 
18 In the illustrations, X remains fixed when σ = 1, but that is an artifact of using very simple quadratic functions 
(C(x) = x
2) to draw the isocost curves.   In that special case,        
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 , implying that at the 
optimum,       1      .  If   
  and   
  solve the first-order conditions for α = 0, then the first two marginal 
conditions yield      √1    
  and        
 , which leaves     unchanged.  Thus, this is the new optimum (given α).  
This result, however, does not generalize for other cost functions. 20 
 
Figure 5.  First-Order Effect of Fiscal Illusion on Cash Outlays and Tax 























































Here are the general conclusions that come from this model in the presence of fiscal illusion.  
Voters’ misperceptions about the cost of tax expenditures result in too much spending through 
tax expenditures and larger government than would occur if voters were fully informed.  If tax 
expenditures and cash outlays are complements, there could also be more outlays than would 
arise with fully informed voters.  In the more likely case where voters perceive tax expenditures 
and cash outlays as substitutes, cash outlays will tend to decline, but overall spending increases 
even more because voters perceive the drop in cash outlays as a drop in the size of government 
and believe that they can afford even more public spending.  Allowing for the possibility that the 
per unit cost of producing tax expenditures and cash outlays increases reduces the increase in the 
amount of tax expenditures, because tax expenditures become more costly as more and more 
government services are produced that way.  In addition to the inefficient allocation of services 
from the voters’ perspective, there is also a production inefficiency.  That is, the cost of 
producing government services per unit increases relative to the optimum in which voters are 
fully informed. 
Obviously, this model oversimplifies reality.  For example, the degree of fiscal illusion may 
decline as E increases and marginal tax rates or deficits rise. But the implication of the model 
comports generally with intuition.  Excluding tax expenditures from budget aggregates increases 
taxes (current or future), overall spending, and tax expenditures.  Government is not only too big 
relative to the optimal size, but the allocation of spending between cash outlays and tax 
expenditures is inefficient.  Making taxes seem artificially low may also cause the level of cash 
outlays to increase compared with the efficient (full disclosure) case. 
Beyond the implications for efficiency and the size of government, the miscounting of tax 
expenditures has implications for tax reform. For example, the president's National Commission 
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, co-chaired by Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson, proposed 
eliminating most tax expenditures, significant spending cuts and reductions in marginal income 
tax rates. That proposal prompted a prominent conservative group to claim that the Bowles-
Simpson plan would violate a pledge many legislators had signed promising never to raise 22 
 
taxes.
19 In fact, if properly accounted for, the Bowles-Simpson proposal would cut taxes 
significantly and make larger cuts in total spending than reported.
20 
2.4. Potential bipartisan appeal of budgeting for tax expenditures 
Another argument against the tax expenditure concept is the notion that it assumes that all 
income belongs to the government unless government deigns to refund it in the form of tax 
breaks.  Interestingly, neither this argument nor the concept of tax expenditure is a new one.  
Brooks (1986) reports that in 1863, William Gladstone, then a Tory member of the British 
parliament, railed against the exemption from income tax of charitable contributions.  He 
complained that the charitable deduction would make no sense as a direct expenditure, 
conflicting as it would with efforts to bring “…the whole expenditure of the State…within the 
control, and under the eye, of the House of Commons.  If this money is to be laid out upon what 
are called charities, why is that portion of the State expenditure to be altogether withdrawn from 
view… and to be so contrived that we shall know nothing of it, and have no control over it…?”
21 
The rebuttal from Sir Strafford Northcote would be familiar to modern critics of tax 
expenditures:  “‘The right hon. Gentleman, if he took £5 out of the pocket of a man with £100, 
put the case as if he gave the man £95…’” (Brooks, 1985, p. 684)  More than a century later, the 
Republican Vice Chairman of Congress’s Joint Economic Committee, Jim Saxton, complained 
that “[t]he tax expenditure concept relies heavily on a normative notion that shielding certain 
taxpayer income from taxation deprives government of its rightful revenues.”  (Saxton 1999) 
The irony of this aspect of the debate is that conservatives usually object to growth of 
government spending.  Presumably it is relevant in evaluating spending on housing programs, for 
                                                 
19 Americans for Tax Reform, which administers the “taxpayer protection pledge,” opined, “Simpson-Bowles is a 
massive tax hike masquerading as tax reform.” (Ellis 2010) 
20 In a February 17, Newshour interview with Judy Woodruff, Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R- Ga.) defended his work 
with Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) in support of the Bowles-Simpson recommendations as consistent with the ATR 
“no tax increase” pledge because the changes would lower tax rates as well as the deficit. He said that he and 
Warner are seeking to adopt changes that would “eliminate some of the tax expenditures … and reduce taxes that 
every individual has to pay simply by reforming the tax code.” http://crackersquire.blogspot.com/2011/02/sens-
chambliss-and-warner-discuss.html.  Accessed March 25, 2011. 
21 Cited in Brooks (1985, pp. 683-684). 23 
 
example, to note that the largest new construction program is not financed by cash expenditures 
overseen by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but the low-income housing 
credit.  One of the largest cash assistance programs for low-income families is the earned income 
tax credit. And so on.  All of these programs could be carried out with cash expenditures, and 
presumably fiscal conservatives would want to monitor their cost and effectiveness if they were 
thus transformed. 
And, as discussed in the previous section, the misattribution of tax expenditures may cause 
overall government spending, taxes, and the deficit to be higher than they would otherwise be, 
and for government resources to be inefficiently allocated in favor of tax expenditures.  The 
revenues lost to inefficient tax expenditures could otherwise be used to reduce the deficit or 
lower tax rates.  Indeed, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, enacted two decades after the government 
began to produce estimates of tax expenditures, illustrates this trade-off.  Top marginal tax rates 
for individuals were cut from 50 percent to 28 percent, and from 46 percent to 34 percent for 
corporations in a package that was designed to be revenue neutral.  (Birnbaum and Murray, 
1988)  The dramatic rate reductions were financed entirely by eliminating or curtailing tax 
expenditures.
22 Millions of taxpayers were also removed from the tax rolls.  All of the recent 
bipartisan tax reform proposals have used some of the revenue gained from eliminating tax 
expenditures to lower marginal income tax rates (and some for deficit reduction).
23  They would 
cut taxes and spending (when tax expenditures are properly accounted for). 
Reducing tax expenditures should appeal to liberals too.  With the exception of the small 
number of refundable tax credits, tax expenditures tend to be middle- and upper-income 
entitlements.  (Burman, Toder, and Geissler 2007)  The privileged status of tax expenditures 
means that spending is skewed in favor of programs that favor the relatively well off.  Efforts to 
reduce spending that ignore tax expenditures necessarily mean that the burden of deficit 
reduction will fall disproportionately on those with lower incomes. 
                                                 
22 There was also a shift of tax liability from individuals to corporations that some viewed as anti-growth. 
Nonetheless, eliminating tax expenditures made possible substantial tax rate cuts which most economists would 
view as efficiency-enhancing. 
23 See, e.g., National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (2010) and Bipartisan Policy Center (2010). 24 
 
And controlling tax expenditures could have the added benefit of simplifying the tax system 
and making it more efficient by reducing the opportunities for tax sheltering.  If some of the 
budget savings are used to cut marginal income tax rates, the efficiency gains would grow.  
Moreover, to the extent that the proliferation of tax expenditures fuels perceptions of unfairness, 
trimming them could enhance the integrity of the income tax.   
In practice, the politics are much more complex.  As noted, all of the budget reduction plans 
would cut tax expenditures, including the plan proposed by House Budget Committee Chairman, 
Paul Ryan (R-WI) and recently passed by the House of Representatives, and the framework laid 
out by President Obama (2011).  A bipartisan group of 64 senators (32 from each party) sent a 
letter to President Obama urging that any debt reduction plan include “discretionary spending 
cuts, entitlement changes and tax reform.”
24 Neither Obama nor Ryan has specified which tax 
expenditures should be reduced or eliminated and Senator Ryan rejected the notion of cutting tax 
expenditures as a way to reduce the deficit (he’d instead use the savings to cut income tax rates), 
but all of the debt reduction plans recognize that substantial amounts of spending run through the 
tax code.  
But there’s still a lot of public skepticism about the concept of tax expenditures.  Jon Stewart, 
host of the satirical Daily Show on Comedy Central, derided president Obama for referring to 
“spending reductions in the tax code.”  This provoked a Stewart rant: “What???  The tax code 
isn’t where we spend.  It’s where we collect. … You managed to talk about a tax hike as a 
spending reduction.  Can we afford that and the royalty checks you’ll have to send to George 
Orwell?”  And Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Ranking Member of the Senate Finance 
Committee argued that tax expenditures and spending have fundamentally different effects on 
the size of government:  “Reducing or eliminating a tax expenditure without lowering rates 
enough to reach a revenue neutral level will cause the size of the federal government to grow, 
while reducing or eliminating spending causes the size of the federal government to shrink.”
 
(Hatch 2011) 
                                                 
24 Letter available at:  http://tinyurl.com/64senators.  25 
 
3.  Budgeting for Tax Expenditures 
As the previous section showed, the characterization of tax expenditures as tax reductions 
may bias policymakers to favor tax expenditures over more effective cash outlay programs or 
deficit reduction.  Integrating tax expenditures explicitly into the existing federal budget process 
could reduce or eliminate that bias.  Beyond simply increasing transparency, treating tax 
expenditures as spending could subject them to effective controls on overall spending as part of 
broader budget reform. 
3.1. Including Tax Expenditures in the Current Budget Process 
Spending through the tax code is currently off the budget table.  Except for the refunded 
portion of refundable tax credits, which are shown as outlays, the cost of existing tax 
expenditures appear in the budget’s summary tables only insofar as they affect net revenues. 
Newly enacted tax expenditures are scored as tax cuts—reducing revenues and increasing the 
deficit.  But tax expenditures are not limited by appropriations.  Most are permanent parts of tax 
law and do not require periodic reconsideration or review.  Growth in the year-to-year value of 
tax expenditures is included (as reductions) in budget baseline projections of revenues and 
requires no legislative action.   
Tax expenditures share many features with mandatory spending:  exemption from control by 
appropriations, permanent authorization, and automatic growth without further action by the 
Congress. However, mandatory spending is explicitly reported in the budget and in the 
functional totals. The exception is Social Security, which has been moved “off budget” through 
legislation.  However, the effect of that re-classification has been diminished by the budget 
agencies’ practice of showing unified budget totals as the sum of both off-budget and on-budget 
sub-totals. 
Tax expenditures and direct spending account for over 70 percent of all federal spending. 
Despite the dominance of tax expenditures and direct spending, there is nothing in the current 
process that forces an affirmative decision on the appropriate size of this spending now or in the 
planning period.  26 
 
Tax expenditures could be included in the budget by treating them as equivalent to other 
forms of mandatory spending.
25  This might involve the following changes to current practice: 
1.  Add tax expenditures to the budget totals consistent with their transactional equivalence 
to a) levying taxes and b) refunding the tax to those who meet the criteria for receiving 
benefits. 
2.  Score the cost of new tax expenditures as increases in spending, rather than as a reduction 
in revenues 
3.  Tally tax expenditures in the Concurrent Budget Resolution’s cap on total budget 
authority and outlays and allocated by function and to committee(s)  of jurisdiction 
4.  Include tax expenditures in reconciliation instructions and omnibus legislation and 
subject them to points of order 
5.  Require the President to revise the budget accounts and functional allocations  to include 
tax expenditures. 
We elaborate on these steps below. 
Add tax expenditures to summary budget totals. The current treatment of tax expenditures 
shows the net effect of tax expenditures on the deficit but fails to identify the amount of fiscal 
resources used in this way or the effect on outlays. Table 4 illustrates an alternative display of tax 
expenditures in the summary budget tables. Tax expenditures, as taxes levied and refunded, 
would not reduce total revenue but rather change its composition and increase budget outlays. 
                                                 
25 The same principles also apply at the state level.  Blumenthal, et al (2011) recently recommended that Minnesota 
fully integrate significant tax expenditures into the budget process and also subject all tax expenditures to review at 
least every eight years.  The review would include an evaluation of cash outlay alternatives to the tax expenditure.  
After the review, the legislature would have to vote to continue the tax expenditure by a “sunset date” or the 
program would lapse. 27 
 
Table 4.  Example of Adding Tax Expenditures to Budget Totals 
Total revenues     4.0 
   Cash   3.0   
   Tax expenditures   1.0    
Total outlays     5.0  
   Cash   4.0    
   Tax expenditures   1.0    
Surplus (deficit)     (1.0)  
Borrowing from the public     1.0 
Note that current budgeting only shows cash revenues, outlays.  
 
The alternative option clarifies both the size and nature of tax expenditures.  It also reduces 
the current budgetary bias in favor of tax expenditures.  
Score new tax expenditures as increases in outlays.  Under current practice, cost estimates for 
new legislation that increases or decreases tax expenditures report the effect on cash revenues 
and the deficit but show no effect on outlays. Consistent with the treatment of other spending, tax 
expenditure legislation would be scored with its outlay effects. Table 5 provides an example for 
legislation that increases tax expenditures. 
Table 5.  Scoring an Increase in Tax Expenditures 
Change in total revenues      0.0  
Cash   -0.1    
Tax expenditures   +0.1    
Change in total outlays     +0.1  
   Cash     0.0    
   Tax expenditures   +0.1    
Change in surplus (deficit)     (0.1)  
Change in borrowing from the public    +0.1  
Note:  Current scoring only shows the change in cash revenues and outlays. 
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Include tax expenditures explicitly in the budget resolution’s cap on total spending and the 
functional distribution tables.  The budget resolution sets aggregate limits on new budget 
authority and outlays and distributes those sums across 20 budget functions, each with numerous 
sub-functions.
26 In addition, though not specified in the resolution, those totals are allocated to 
each of the legislative committees of jurisdiction. These are referred to as Section 203 allocations 
for the section of the Budget Act that authorizes them. Discretionary appropriations are allocated 
to the appropriations committees and direct spending to the authorizing committees. These 
allocations constitute the legislative spending budgets for each committee.  
Under current practice, tax expenditures are not allocated to functions or committees.  They 
are tabulated by function, and shown in a report that supplements the budget data, but is not a 
part of it.  Under comprehensive treatment, tax expenditures would be included in the budget 
resolution by function and sub-function and allocated to the committees of jurisdiction. That 
allocation could also reflect shared jurisdiction between authorizing and tax committees. Further, 
tax expenditures would be assigned to a new or existing budget account and all new accounts 
would be assigned to a budget sub-function.  This change could promote trade-offs within tax 
expenditures and across tax expenditures and other forms of spending.       
Add tax expenditures to the President’s budget. To maintain consistency between the 
president’s budget and Congressional practice, the executive budget would move tax 
expenditures from supplementary material into the budget accounts, functional distributions, and 
summary budget totals. 
Moving tax expenditures into the budget and treating them as other forms of spending would 
be a step toward more comprehensive and transparent budgeting, but it is not a panacea.  It does 
not guarantee tax reform or that inefficient tax expenditures would be converted into cash 
spending programs or eliminated.  At best, it communicates more clearly and accurately the 
                                                 
26 One of the functional spending categories, number 920, is the Allowances function.  The Budget Act intended 
Congress to budget funds for uncertain spending on items such as natural disaster relief and recovery.  Congress, 
however, has preferred the concept of emergency spending, which is “unplanned” and exempt from budget limits 
and controls.  Some analysts have proposed dropping 920 since it is never used, leaving only 19 functional 
categories.   29 
 
nature, size, and cost of tax expenditures.  It aims to provide equivalent information about tax 
expenditures and other forms of spending.   
3.2. Enforcement of Caps on Tax Expenditures 
A fundamental challenge in imposing caps on spending is that they require an effective 
enforcement mechanism.  Even for cash outlays, experience with Gramm-Rudman-Hollins 
suggests that excessively harsh penalties, while theoretically plausible, are ineffective in practice. 
Policymakers will simply subvert enforcement mechanisms if the political cost of accepting the 
penalty is greater than the cost of dodging it. 
One approach to enforcement would be to have an automatic fallback mechanism to achieve 
targets if Congress fails to meet the global caps.  The Bowles-Simpson plan included a failsafe 
mechanism that combined sequesters and tax increases.  The president has also proposed a 
trigger with across-the-board cuts in cash outlays and tax expenditures.  In contrast, the Budget 
Control Act, passed to resolve the debt limit impasse, contains a sequester for discretionary and 
some mandatory spending, but no limits on tax expenditures. 
Across-the-board cuts in tax expenditures would be complex, and possibly unworkable.  
OMB could, in principal, reduce all deductions, exclusions, and credits by set percentage, x, to 
meet a tax expenditure target, but that would require the partial inclusion of excluded income 
items such as employer-sponsored health insurance, pension contributions, and other fringe 
benefits, which would require employers to report the value of all of those items every year 
(against the chance that they might be partially taxable).  In theory, a portion of tax-exempt 
interest might be made taxable.  This would immediately add a risk premium to municipal bond 
yields, making them even less efficient as a way to aid state and local governments than they are 
now.  As a practical matter, certain items, such as the tax break on pension contributions and the 
interest tax exemption, would probably be exempted from any sequester. 
There’s a question about whether depreciation and other timing preferences would also be 
reduced, but, if so, that would reduce future years' tax collections.  It is unclear how to treat 
preferences such as the lower tax rates that apply to capital gains and dividends (although that's 
not an issue in the proposals of the president’s fiscal commission or the Bipartisan Policy Center, 
since they would eliminate the rate differentials).  One possibility would be to convert the 30 
 
alternate rates into partial exclusions—e.g., exclude 60 percent of long-term capital gains and 
dividends from tax.  In the event of a sequester, x percent of the excluded gains and dividends 
would be added back into taxable income. 
The Bowles-Simpson failsafe plan requires cross-the-board cuts in cash outlays combined 
with proportional increases in statutory tax rates.  This is more practical, but it does have the 
unintended side effect of making all deduction and exclusion preferences larger so part of the 
revenue gains are lost to larger expenditures.  If the goal is to create an enforcement mechanism 
that is so painful that policymakers would be spurred to act, the combination of rate increases 
and automatic spending cuts might be effective because presumably liberals would want to avoid 
the indiscriminant spending cuts and conservatives would want to avoid the rate increases.  On 
the other hand, there's a concern that if the mechanism is too draconian, policymakers will 
simply circumvent it—for example, by including legislation waiving the requirement or altering 
the caps along with the otherwise noncompliant spending legislation. 
 Another option in the BPC plan would be to adjust the VAT rate to offset tax expenditure 
overages.  That would have several advantages.  First, it would be relatively simple.  Second, it 
would have smaller efficiency costs than increases in income tax rates.  Third, assuming a very 
broad-based VAT, it would not increase the value of tax expenditures.  Fourth, it would affect 
everyone, not just those with positive income tax liability.  Burman (2009) argued that a VAT 
earmarked to pay for healthcare costs could help constrain healthcare costs because voters would 
be more amenable to otherwise unpopular cuts to Medicare and Medicaid spending if the 
alternative was a rising VAT rate.  Of course, that assumes that policymakers do not respond to 
political pressure by simply severing the connection between the VAT and health spending. 
Another option to limit tax expenditures is the proposal made by Martin Feldstein, Maya 
Maguineas, and Dan Feenberg (2011) to cap the value of certain tax expenditures at two percent 
of adjusted gross income (AGI).  This approach has the drawback of significantly complicating 
compliance for some taxpayers and would remove almost all incentive effects from the affected 
tax expenditures.  Feldstein, et al, point out that many taxpayers would face simpler tax returns 
because they would switch from itemizing to claiming the standard deduction, but for people 
with high enough incomes, it is effectively a new alternative minimum tax (where the minimum 31 
 
tax is calculated by eliminating the affected tax expenditures, recalculating tax and subtracting 
two percent of AGI).  Furthermore, if the existing AMT remains, the interactions would be 
extremely complex—virtually impossible to manage without tax prep software in part because 
the standard deduction is an AMT preference item so the choice of whether to itemize would be 
very complicated.  A much simpler alternative to Feldstein's scheme would be to simply 
eliminate the targeted tax expenditures and create a new standard deduction equal to the 
maximum of the existing standard deduction and eight percent of AGI, which would be 
approximately revenue neutral.  That, however, would make it obvious that the tax expenditures 
had been eliminated, which Feldstein, et al, wanted to obscure in hopes that would make the 
proposal more politically saleable. 
 The advantage of Feldstein's tax expenditure limit is that it would make controlling 
individual income tax expenditures quite simple.  The percentage of AGI  could be adjusted to 
enforce the trigger.  That is, it could be lowered to reduce the total value of tax expenditures to 
meet the cap.  This is a decidedly second-best option (as all AMTs are), but it does have the 
virtue of making a tax expenditure limit practical.  Also, starting with a higher percentage of AGI 
may ease the transition to the new regime.  For example, the limit could start at six percent of 
AGI and phase down over the course of several years. 
4.  Conclusion 
Policy analysts have long recognized that much spending is hidden in the tax code.  Many tax 
expenditures are effectively open-ended entitlement programs like Social Security or Medicare, 
and even harder to monitor and control because they do not show up in traditional budget tables.  
Political scientist Chris Howard (1997) aptly named them “The Hidden Welfare State.” 
This paper takes tax expenditure analysis one step forward by showing how the 
characterization of tax expenditures may systematically lead to more overall spending (bigger 
government), higher taxes, larger deficits, and a misallocation of resources away from cash 
spending programs in favor of tax expenditures.  For those who favor smaller government, more 
efficient government, and lower taxes, this should be a source of concern.  Moreover, since tax 
expenditures tend to benefit families with higher incomes, the misallocation of scarce resources 
away from traditional spending programs may raise equity concerns as well. 32 
 
Integrating tax expenditures into the budget process and subjecting them (and all other 
spending) to effective controls could improve the efficiency of government and soften the blow 
from the belt tightening that is necessary if we are to avoid a debt crisis.  An added benefit is that 
reductions in tax expenditures could simplify the income tax and make it less prone to abuse, 
especially if part of the revenues from the trimmed tax expenditures were used to cut marginal 
income tax rates.  That is, controlling tax expenditures might increase the chances of enacting tax 
reform. 
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